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• A series of ﬁnancial crises in emerging-market
economies during the 1990s was the catalyst for
efforts to strengthen the international ﬁnancial
system.
• Such efforts have focused on two broad areas:
crisis prevention and crisis management. Under
crisis prevention, particular attention has been
paid to the need for appropriate macroeconomic
policies, including sustainable exchange rate
regimes, prudent risk management by
governments and lending institutions, sound
domestic ﬁnancial systems, and transparent
national policies.
• Under crisis management, agreement has been
reached on providing the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) with access to additional resources
for lending to countries experiencing ﬁnancial
crises. New lending facilities for countries that
might need ﬁnancial assistance have also been
established at the IMF.
• It is also agreed that IMF money available to
countries seeking assistance is limited, and that
the private sector will consequently have to play
a greater role than in the past in crisis resolution.
Work continues on ﬁnding an appropriate balance
between providing ofﬁcial assistance to countries
in crisis and allowing debtors and private
creditors to ﬁnd their own solutions to debt
problems.
• New international groups involving major
emerging-market economies have been established
to discuss global policy issues and to promote
international ﬁnancial stability.
he Mexican peso crisis, which broke in
December 1994, was the catalyst for major
reform of the international ﬁnancial system.
Mexico’s crawling-peg exchange rate system
collapsed and, despite massive ﬁnancial assistance
from the international community, the country experi-
enced a deep recession.1   The Mexican crisis had
repercussions throughout the world. Other countries
in Latin America, such as Argentina, which shared
many of Mexico’s economic characteristics, experi-
enced signiﬁcant capital outﬂows (the so-called
“tequila effect”). Some advanced countries, including
Canada, also felt the side effects of the peso crisis as
investors closely scrutinized the relative merits of
countries as recipients of capital ﬂows.
These events prompted the major advanced countries
to re-examine the international ﬁnancial system and to
seek improvements that would reduce the frequency
and virulence of financial crises. Such a major reassess-
ment of the system had not occurred since the mid-
1970s, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system of ﬁxed exchange rates. Endorsed by leaders at
the Halifax Summit, work by the Group of Ten coun-
tries began in the summer of 1995. The goal was to
ensure that the IMF had adequate resources to meet
potential demands from member countries and that it
could respond quickly to ﬁnancial crises. The group
also looked for new ways to prevent crises and to
manage them when they did occur.
Two years later, fresh crises in emerging markets lent
new urgency to the reform efforts. In late 1997, Thailand,
Indonesia, and Korea, economies that had previously
been considered well managed, experienced major
financial crises in quick succession. Like Mexico, the
three countries experienced sharp recessions and
marked declines in the external value of their currencies.
1.  Total international assistance to Mexico amounted to roughly US$40 billion.
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Record ﬁnancial-assistance packages were assembled
by the IMF and the development banks, buttressed by
additionalshort-termlendingfromindustrialcountries.2
Other Asian economies were also affected, including
Malaysia and the Philippines. During 1998 and early
1999, the contagion spread. In August 1998, Russia
defaulted on its domestic obligations and ﬂoated the
rouble, prompting investors to reassess their lending
to all emerging markets. Yield spreads between
emerging-market debt and U.S. Treasury debt soared,
and a major hedge fund, which had speculated on
interest rate spreads, ran into ﬁnancial difﬁculties. In
the autumn of 1998, Brazil, a major international bor-
rower, sought ﬁnancial support from the Fund and
from the international community totalling approxi-
mately US$42 billion in response to signiﬁcant capital
outﬂows. Despite this assistance, Brazil was forced to
ﬂoat its currency in January 1999.
With some commentators calling the 1997–98 global
ﬁnancial crisis the worst in 50 years, policy-makers
and market participants around the world redoubled
their efforts to reform the “international ﬁnancial
architecture.” Their efforts have focused on two broad
areas: crisis prevention and crisis management.
This article outlines the issues regarding institutional
and policy reform that have been discussed at the
international level as well as the steps that have been
taken to strengthen the international ﬁnancial system.
It follows an earlier Review article that examined the
causes and timing of currency crises, a subject of con-
siderable economic research in recent years (Osakwe
and Schembri 1998).
Crisis Prevention
Measures to reduce the frequency of international crises
have taken two broad forms. First, new international
bodies have been created and old ones strengthened
to help identify, discuss, and deal with problems in the
global financial system in a timely fashion. Second,
countries have taken various measures to reduce their
vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises. These measures have
often been implemented with the assistance of inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions.
New international groups
The global repercussions of the crises in emerging
markets underscored the growing importance of these
2.  Total international assistance for Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea amounted
to roughly US$17 billion, US$47 billion, and US$58 billion, respectively.
economies and the need to involve them in interna-
tional discussions and decision-making. Thus, in 1998,
sevenemerging-marketeconomiesjoinedthe G-10and
other advanced countries in providing the IMF with
access to supplementary resources that it could draw
upon in financial crises.3 (See section on IMF resources.)
As well, monetary authorities from over 20 emerging
markets have become shareholders in the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) and actively participate
in discussions among central banks held at that venue.4
Several new groups were also formed. The Financial
Stability Forum (FSF) was established in the spring of
1999, following a report commissioned by the G-7
ﬁnance ministers and governors the previous year.
The forum consists of national authorities responsible
for ﬁnancial stability in G-7 countries (supervisors,
central banks, and finance ministries) as well as
Australia, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Singapore,
representatives of standard-setting bodies, and inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions. The FSF identiﬁes and
assesses vulnerabilities in the international ﬁnancial
system, oversees initiatives to address systemic vul-
nerabilities, and improves coordination and informa-
tion exchanges among national and international
authorities. Working groups of the FSF, which have
included representatives of emerging markets, have
examined a range of issuesincluding highly leveraged
institutions, capital ﬂows, offshore ﬁnancial centres,
deposit insurance, and key standards for sound ﬁnan-
cial systems.
Another important group established in 1999 is the
Group of 20 (G-20). While G-7 ﬁnance ministers and
central bank governors have met frequently since the
1980s to discuss international economic developments,
the crisis in emerging markets underscored the need
for similar, ongoing discussions among a broader,
more globally representative, group of countries.
The G-20 membership includes ﬁnance ministers and
governors from 19 countries and the European Union.5
The IMF and the World Bank are also represented. The
G-20’S mandate is to discuss and review global policy
issues and, more generally, to promote international
3.  These seven are: the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Korea, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Thailand.
4.  These include: China, Russia, India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South
Africa, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Singapore, and Hong Kong. East-
ern European countries and the Baltic states are also represented.
5.  Countries in the G-20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
ﬁnancial stability. Issues discussed have included
exchange rate regimes, standards and codes, debt
management, and the role of the private sector in
managing and resolving ﬁnancial crises. With most
systemically important countries represented directly,
or indirectly, the G-20 can provide strong political
support for global initiatives. It can also address
issues that transcend any single international ﬁnancial
institution. Paul Martin, Canada’s Minister of Finance,
is the current chairman of the G-20.
In September 1999, the Interim Committee of the IMF,
its principal advisory body, was transformed into the
International Monetary and Financial Committee
(IMFC). The committee’s membership consists of IMF
governors (typically ﬁnance ministers or central bank
governors) of those countries that have been appointed
or elected to the IMF’S 24-member Executive Board. As
was the case with the Interim Committee, the IMFC
advises and reports to the IMF’S Board of Governors
on IMF-related issues, including the international
monetary and ﬁnancial system. The transformation
of the Interim Committee involved more than just a
name change. Its advisory role was strengthened with
the introduction of a deputies’ process. IMFC deputies
from ﬁnance ministries and central banks now regu-
larly meet before IMFC meetings to allow for greater
debate and consensus-building among IMF members
on key issues.
The recent crises in Asian countries
demonstrated that low inﬂation and
sound ﬁscal accounts were not
sufﬁcient to avoid a ﬁnancial crisis.
Measures to reduce vulnerability
Effortstoreducethevulnerabilityofcountriestofinancial
crises have been directed to many areas. This reflects the
complexity of the  problem and the value of a holistic
approach to crisis prevention. The recent crises in Asian
countries, for example, demonstrated that low inflation
and sound fiscal accounts were not sufficient to avoid a
financial crisis. Efforts to reduce vulnerabilities have
involved a large number of players, including the
national authorities of both advanced and emerging-
market economies, international financial institutions,
and international standard-setting bodies.
Macroeconomic policies
The ﬁrst line of defence against ﬁnancial crises is to
ensure that a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals
are sound and that there is a policy framework that
can deal with economic and ﬁnancial shocks. Fiscal
policy must be on a sustainable track, with monetary
policy directed at achieving low and stable inﬂation.
The choice of exchange rate regime is also extremely
important. A common feature of all the crises in
emerging markets during the 1990s was an unwilling-
ness to adjust a ﬁxed, or quasi-ﬁxed, exchange rate in
response to changing economic circumstances.
While no single exchange rate system is likely to be
suited to all countries under all circumstances, there is
growing support for the view that traditional pegged,
or crawling-peg, exchange rate regimes are less sus-
tainable than fully flexible systems, or “hard” exchange
pegs (e.g., a currency board, dollarization, or currency
union). Indeed, during the 1990s, the percentage of
IMF members maintaining intermediate exchange rate
regimes fell by roughly one-half (Fischer 2001).
Intermediate exchange rate systems are susceptible to
crises for two main reasons. First, it is often politically
difﬁcult for a country to change its exchange rate
regime without a crisis. During tranquil periods, there
is no incentive to ﬂoat, while during periods of stress,
policy-makers are concerned that ﬂoating will dam-
age their policy credibility.
Second, a ﬁxed exchange rate can act as an apparent
guarantee to borrowers and investors, relieving them
of the need to hedge themselves against adverse
exchange rate changes. As long as an exchange rate
peg is credible and foreign currency interest rates are
lower than domestic rates, as is typically the case in
emerging markets, there is an incentive for domestic
borrowers in developing countries to borrow in for-
eign currency. However, should conﬁdence in the gov-
ernment’s ability to defend the exchange rate erode, a
“race for the exits” can occur, ultimately leading to a
currency crisis. In many emerging-market economies,
the incentive to borrow in foreign currency was often
magniﬁed by underdeveloped domestic ﬁnancial
systems.
Given this market dynamic, a country with an open
capital market essentially has two long-run choices: to
introduce a ﬂexible exchange rate (combined impor-
tantly with an accompanying domestic anchor for
monetary policy), or to reinforce a ﬁxed exchange rate10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
by introducing a currency board or adopting a com-
mon currency, thereby reducing, or eliminating, the
prospect of a successful speculative attack.
Capital controls
The success of China, India, and Chile, which main-
tained capital controls during the 1990s, in avoiding
the emerging-market crises, has given credence to the
view that controls may be a useful additional tool for
macroeconomic management in emerging-market
economies. Particular attention has been paid to the
Chilean experience, where the authorities introduced
reserve requirements in the early 1990s that discour-
aged short-term capital inﬂows—the type of money
typically viewed as the most at risk of ﬂight should
investor sentiment change. Studies of the Chilean case
suggest that while such controls had limited success
in reducing the overall size of capital inﬂows, they
were effective in altering the composition of inﬂows
away from short-term money in favour of longer-term
funds (Valdés-Prieto and Soto 1998 or Cowan and De
Gregorio 1998).
Critics of controls, however, point to other reasons for
Chile’s success. These include a healthy ﬁnancial sys-
tem, good macroeconomic management, and a signiﬁ-
cant degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility. Previous
experience has also shown that the effectiveness of
controls erodes over time as market participants learn
to circumvent them (Mathieson and Rojas-Suárez
1993). Indeed, the ability to evade controls is likely to
have increased in recent years because of technologi-
cal developments, ﬁnancial innovations (especially
derivatives), better communications, and broader eco-
nomic linkages among countries. Controls may also
impose other costs on the economy, for example
increased corruption, expansion of the underground
economy, and a reduction of capital to companies that
don’t have access to alternative sources of ﬁnancing.
Nonetheless, prudential controls on inﬂows into the
banking system could be a useful temporary expedi-
ent in countries with fragile or undeveloped ﬁnancial
systems.
The case for controls on capital outﬂows is considera-
bly less compelling. To the extent that they are effec-
tive, controls may reduce market discipline, allowing
governments to pursue poor macroeconomic policies
for extended periods.   As with controls over capital
inﬂows, controls on outﬂows erode over time. Indeed,
experience during the 1970s and 1980s has shown that
such controls were ineffective in limiting capital ﬂight
from developing countries. Moreover, such controls
may lead to reduced capital inﬂows if potential inves-
tors worry about their ability to remove their funds in
the future. Nevertheless, temporary controls on capi-
tal outﬂows may be helpful in times of severe ﬁnancial
crisis, providing an opportunity for governments to
implement necessary changes in domestic policy.
Sound domestic ﬁnancial systems
One distinguishing characteristic of the recent ﬁnan-
cial crises in emerging markets was the prominent role
played by domestic ﬁnancial institutions. In most
cases, the magnitude of the crisis was exacerbated by
weak banking systems. While the causality between
balance-of-paymentscrisesandbankingcrisescanrun
in both directions, a banking crisis often precedes a
balance-of-payments crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart
1996).
Given these linkages, the international community
has focused on strengthening ﬁnancial systems in
both emerging-market economies and advanced
countries.  Particular emphasis has been placed on
establishing internationally accepted codes and stand-
ards of best practices to help guide authorities in such
efforts. To date, roughly 60 such standards have been
developed, the bulk of which focus on various aspects
of ﬁnancial regulation and supervision (Financial Sta-
bility Forum 2000a).
While a large number of international institutions
have been involved in helping to develop codes and
standards, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the
BIS, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision has
taken the lead. Following up on a call by G-7leaders at
the Lyons Summit in 1996, the Basel Committee devel-
oped 25 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervi-
sion (Basel Committee 1997). These principles, which
were developed in consultation with non-G-10 super-
visory authorities and released in 1997, cover seven
broad headings including preconditions for effective
supervision, licensing and structure, prudential regu-
lations, methods of ongoing supervision, information
requirements, powers of supervisors, and cross-bor-
der banking. Comparable principles were subse-
quently developed for securities supervision by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) and for insurance supervision by the Interna-
tional Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
In 1999, a working group of the Basel Committee
released a followup report that examined the ade-
quacy of the core principles in light of the Asian crisis.
Among other things, this report contended that some
creditor banks may have increased their exposure to11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
private borrowers under the assumption that their
loans would be protected by an implicit government
guarantee, which led them to take on larger exposures
than they would have done otherwise. The report also
underscored the importance of sound liquidity and
credit-risk management by banks and argued that the
interrelationship of various types of risks—especially
liquidity risk and market risk—and the speed and
extent to which financial crises spread from one country
to another, had been underestimated during the Asian
crisis (Bonte et al. 1999). This further underscored the
importance of strong risk-management systems.
Following the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, a major U.S. hedge fund, in September
1998, the Basel Committee issued additional guide-
lines in early 1999, which emphasized that effective
management of counterparty risk was essential for
prudent banking (Basel Committee 1999a).6
Work also continued on updating the capital-ade-
quacy framework for internationally active banks,
which was originally introduced in 1988. The Basel
Committee’s revised framework was released for public
consultation in late 1999. The framework was based
on three pillars: (i) minimum regulatory capital,
(ii) supervisory reviews of an institution’s capital and
assessment process, and (iii) market discipline (Basel
Committee 1999b). The Basel Committee also proposed
a new system for weighting risk based on external
credit assessments. For certain sophisticated banks,
the committee suggested that internal ratings could be
used, subject to guidelines and supervisory approval.
The upshot of these changes would be to reduce the
amount of capital that banks would be obliged to hold
against loans to high-quality corporations and to
increase the amount of capital required against loans
to low-quality borrowers.
A second consultative document on the Basel Capital
Accord was released in mid-January 2001 for public
comment by the end of May. It is envisaged that the
new accord will be ﬁnalized by the Basel Committee
6. Hedge funds themselves have also been the subject of considerable discus-
sion, particularly their activities leading up to and during the Asian crisis.
Although such funds were active in some countries, the consensus is that they
did not play a pivotal role. Domestic ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial institutions
were typically “ﬁrst off the mark” to sell Asian currencies (Eichengreen and
Mathieson 1999). Nonetheless, concern about the activities of hedge funds has
promoted debate over the merits of increased regulation of such funds as well
as greater public disclosure of their balance sheets.  Most reports on the activ-
ities of hedge funds (e.g., by the Basel Committee or IOSCO) have come out
against direct regulation, at least for the time being, waiting to see whether
other indirect measures can effectively improve credit-risk management and
moderate the amount of leverage in the global ﬁnancial system.
by the end of the year, with implementation expected
in 2004.
The development of safe and efﬁcient payments sys-
tems for the transfer of funds between ﬁnancial insti-
tutions—an essential feature of an effective ﬁnancial
system—has been another area of considerable inter-
national co-operation. In 1998, the Committee on Pay-
ment and Settlement Systems at the BIS established a
task force on payments systems and practices. This
task force was composed of representatives from the
central banks of advanced countries (including the
Bank ofCanada) and emerging-market economies,the
IMF, the BIS, and the World Bank. Following public
consultations, guiding principles for systemically
important payments systems were published in
January 2001 (Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems 2001). The report’s 10 core principles are seen
as being particularly helpful for emerging-market
economies that are trying to improve existing systems
in order to cope with growing domestic and interna-
tional capital ﬂows.7
Given the large number of internationally accepted
codes and standards, the limited resources of many
emerging markets, and differing priorities among
countries, it has been necessary to prioritize. To con-
centrate efforts on those deemed to be most important
for ﬁnancial stability, a task force of the Financial Sta-
bility Forum recently established a list of 12 key codes
and standards for sound ﬁnancial systems. In addition
to dealing with ﬁnancial regulation and supervision,
they cover macroeconomic fundamentals (ﬁscal pol-
icy, monetary policy, and data dissemination) as well
as institutional and market infrastructure (insolvency,
corporate governance, accounting, auditing, payments
and settlement systems, and market integrity).
To assist emerging-market economies to develop the
necessary supervisory expertise, international ﬁnan-
cial institutions and national supervisory authorities
have provided considerable technical assistance. In
1999, the BIS, in conjunction with the Basel Commit-
tee, established the Financial Stability Institute with a
mandate to help supervisors improve and strengthen
their ﬁnancial systems. The institute works closely
with the Toronto International Leadership Centre for
Financial Sector Supervision, which was founded in
1998 with ﬁnancial support from the Government of
Canada and the World Bank.
7.  See “Core Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems and
Their Application in Canada,” by Clyde Goodlet in this issue of the Review, p. 19.12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
The G-20 countries have agreed on the importance of
standards and codes to address weaknesses in ﬁnan-
cial systems, have endorsed the work of the Financial
Stability Forum, and have encouraged continued
work on incentives to promote implementation.  The
IMF reviews countries’ adherence to international
codes and standards in the context of its regular
assessments of its members’ economic policies and
prospects. Reports on the Observation of Standards
and Codes are now published. The Fund works
closely with the World Bank and with other bodies
that set international standards.
Debt management
A broad international consensus has also emerged
regarding the importance of prudent asset-liability
management, with a particular focus on the balance
sheets of governments and the ﬁnancial system
(Financial Stability Forum 2000b).
Of course, prudent government debt management
starts with a ﬁscal policy that is on a sustainable track.
A rising level of government indebtedness as a pro-
portion of national income will eventually threaten
ﬁnancial stability. But care must also be taken to avoid
excessive reliance on short-term borrowing, particu-
larly in foreign currency, and on the “bunching” of
debt payments. Governments must also consider con-
tingent claims upon them, such as sovereign guaran-
tees of private sector debts.
The nature of a government’s liabilities and its ability
to borrow in international capital markets will also
affect the management of a country’s foreign assets.
Countries with a high proportion of liquid liabilities
and a low international credit rating should hold more
international reserves than countries with a high
credit rating and few maturing liabilities. By the same
token, countries pursuing a fixed exchange rate
regime also need to hold more reserves.
In assessing a country’s vulnerability to financial crises,
it is useful for the government to also be aware of the
activities of the other principal players in the economy,
particularly ﬁnancial institutions. While such institu-
tions are subject to regulatory and supervisory over-
sight and manage their own liquidity, in a crisis,
governments may be called upon to provide their
ﬁnancial institutions with foreign currency support
(e.g., Korea in 1997–98). To facilitate the monitoring
of external exposures, the establishment of a national
balance sheet of a country’s external assets and
liabilities, breaking out key sectors, might also prove
useful. Care would have to be taken, however, to
avoid moral hazard. Such a situation could arise if
market participants came to believe that the risks that
they incur were being moderated by the actions of
government. Guidelines on good practices in public
debt management are currently being developed by
the IMF and the World Bank in collaboration with
national debt-management experts.
The development of domestic
ﬁnancial markets, both bond markets
and banking systems, has also been
widely supported as a way of
reducing the vulnerability of
emerging-market economies to
ﬁnancial crises.
The development of domestic ﬁnancial markets, both
bond markets and banking systems, has also been
widely supported as a way of reducing the vulnerabil-
ity of emerging-market economies to ﬁnancial crises.
Evidence suggests that the domestic ﬁnancial sector
plays a critical role in ensuring that capital inﬂows
contribute to higher economic growth (Bailliu 2000).
In the absence of an adequate domestic market, bor-
rowers have limited options. Either they borrow
short-term money in domestic currency and risk being
unable to roll over their loans at affordable interest
rates in the event of a ﬁnancial crisis, or they borrow
longer-term money in foreign currency and risk being
unable to service their debts in the event of a devalua-
tion of the domestic currency because of the increased
cost in domestic currency.
Enhanced transparency
While the necessity of reliable, timely economic and
ﬁnancial data has long been recognized for the efﬁ-
cient operation of markets, the Mexican peso crisis
underscored the importance of increased transpar-
ency. A thorough understanding of economic condi-
tions in countries helps in two ways. First, a stream of
timely, accurate data helps investors adjust to new
information more smoothly. Second, accurate data
reduce the risk of contagion. As noted earlier, several
countries were adversely affected by the 1994 peso crisis
because they were thought to be similar to Mexico—
the so-called “tequila effect.” Better information can
help markets to distinguish risk levels among countries.13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
Internationally accepted standards for the dissemina-
tion of data were established in early 1996 when the
IMF introduced the Special Data Dissemination Stand-
ard (SDDS). This standard was established to guide
member countries “that have, or that might seek,
access to international capital markets in the provision
of their economic and ﬁnancial data to the public”
(IMF Web site). To date, 47 countries have subscribed
to the standard, which covers four broad dimen-
sions—the data themselves (i.e., coverage, frequency,
and timeliness), public accessibility, the integrity of
the data, and their quality. Data covered by the stand-
ard include output, prices, the ﬁscal accounts, and the
external accounts. In response to shortcomings that
became apparent as a result of the Asian crisis, the
SDDS has recently been enhanced by the inclusion of
information on international reserves and liquidity
management.
The IMF maintains an electronic bulletin board that
describes the dissemination practices of countries that
subscribe to the standard. Many countries, including
Canada, provide hyperlinks between this bulletin
board and sources that provide national data.
In December 1997, a less-demanding General Data
Dissemination System (GDDS), open to all IMF mem-
bers on a voluntary basis, was also established. In
addition to the macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and external
data covered by the SDDS, the GDDS also includes
information related to population, education, poverty,
and health. Unlike the SDDS, the GDDS is less prescrip-
tive and does not set deadlines for participants to
meet certain objectives with respect to data quality.
Enhanced economic surveillance
The International Monetary Fund is the world’s lead-
ing economic surveillance institution. Through its
“Article IV” consultations with member countries, it
regularly reviews and comments on the economic
developments, policies, and prospects of its members.
Following the Asian crisis and an extensive external
review (IMF 1999), the IMF took steps to strengthen its
surveillance practices. Working with other interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions and competent profes-
sional bodies, the IMF has broadened the scope of its
surveillance. It now pays more attention to develop-
ments and trends in capital accounts, including the
risks of reversals in capital ﬂows, policy interdepend-
ence and contagion, and the health of domestic ﬁnan-
cial sectors. The Fund also participates in regional
surveillance exercises such as the “Manila Frame-
work” meetings of countries on the Paciﬁc Rim.
To strengthen its surveillance of ﬁnancial systems, the
IMF, in collaboration with the World Bank, launched
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Such
assessments identify the strengths, weaknesses, and
risks of members’ ﬁnancial systems. These assess-
ments, which feed into the IMF’S regular surveillance
process, are conducted by teams composed of staff
from the IMF and from other international bodies, as
well as national supervisors and central banks.  Can-
ada was one of the ﬁrst countries to undergo such an
assessment (IMF 2000b). Canadian experts, including
representatives from the Bank of Canada, have partici-
pated in assessments of other countries.
As already noted, the IMF has also assumed a leading
role in monitoring country compliance with interna-
tionally accepted codes and standards.
In an effort to strengthen its surveillance activities and
provide more information to markets about Fund pro-
grams and their underlying assumptions, the IMF has
also become more open regarding the policy recom-
mendations and programs negotiated with member
countries. Since mid-1997, the IMF has been releasing
public information notices (or PINS) on the conclu-
sions of Article IV discussions at the Executive Board.
Letters of intent and policy-framework papers issued
by members are now also routinely released to the
public. In June 1999, a pilot project was launched for
the voluntary publication of reports of Article IV con-
sultations with countries. The IMF’S report on Canada,
aswellasthestatementbythe IMFmissiontoCanadaon
Canadian economic policies, is published regularly. 8
Crisis Management
No matter how effective preventive measures are,
ﬁnancial crises will occur. Efforts to improve crisis
management have taken two tracks. The ﬁrst involved
ensuring that the IMF has the necessary ﬁnancial
resources and lending programs, as well as the ability
to respond quickly to crises. The second involved
ﬁnding new and better ways of dealing with ﬁnancial
crises.
IMF resources
After the Mexican peso crisis, work began to ensure
that the Fund’s own resources were adequate, given
the expansion of the global economy and increased
capital mobility, and that it had access to sufﬁcient
supplementary resources in the event that its own
8.  For information on the 2001 Report and Mission Statement, see the
Department of Finance’s Web site, press release, 1  February  2001 and the
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resources were not enough to deal with a potentially
systemic ﬁnancial crisis. At the Halifax Summit in
June 1995, G-7 leaders called for a doubling of the
SDR17 billion available to the IMF under the General
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) to respond to ﬁnancial
crises.9 Following lengthy negotiations, the New
Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) were approved by the
IMF’s Executive Board in early 1997 and came into
force in November 1998. Under the NAB, 25 participat-
ing countries and monetary authorities agreed to pro-
vide up to SDR34 billion in supplementary resources
to the IMF to help it “forestall or cope with an impair-
ment of the international monetary system or to deal
with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to the
stability of that system.”10 The establishment of the
NAB did not replace the GAB, which remained in
force. However, the NAB became the arrangement of
ﬁrst recourse.
The GAB was activated during the summer of 1998 to
help ﬁnance the IMF’S loan of SDR8.5 billion to Russia.
This was the ﬁrst time in 20 years that the GAB had
been activated. Following its entry into force, the NAB
was activated in December 1998 to help ﬁnance the
IMF’s loan of SDR13 billion to Brazil.
The Fund has also taken steps to increase its own
resources. A 45 per cent quota increase, raising the
Fund’s total quotas to SDR210 billion, took effect in
January 1999.11
Emergency-ﬁnancing mechanism
Events surrounding the Mexican peso crisis in late
1994, underscored the need for rapid response by the
IMF in a world of increasingly mobile capital. In
September 1995, the Executive Board agreed to an
9.  The General Arrangements to Borrow were established in 1962 between
the IMF and a group of industrial countries, which, as members were added,
became known as the Group of 10 countries (G-10). The GAB was initially
intended to provide additional resources to the IMF in support of the then-
prevailing system of ﬁxed exchange rates. An SDR, or special drawing right,
represents a basket of currencies consisting of the U.S. dollar, the euro, the
Japanese yen, and the pound sterling. At year-end 2000, one SDR was worth
CAN$1.95.
10.  See IMF Press Release No. 98/57, “IMF’s New Arrangements to Borrow
Enter into Force.” NAB participants include Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, the Deutsche Bundesbank, Finland, France, the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malay-
sia, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, the Sveriges
Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Canada’s share is SDR1,396 million.
11.  Quotas are the IMF’s main source of funds and represent capital subscrip-
tions paid by member countries. Only a portion of these quotas is readily
available for IMF lending. The Fund’s usable resources consist of its holdings
of SDRs and currencies of member countries that are viewed as having rela-
tively strong balance-of-payments and reserve positions.
“emergency ﬁnancial mechanism” that allowed for an
accelerated approval procedure for IMF ﬁnancial sup-
port in special circumstances. The possibility of spill-
over effects (e.g., contagion) would also be considered.
The emergency-ﬁnancing mechanism is expected to
be used only rarely. To qualify for accelerated IMF
support, a member must be willing to negotiate
quickly with the Fund and to introduce strong meas-
ures to deal with the crisis. A requesting member’s
pastbehaviour, inparticular itswillingness toco-operate
with the Fund, would also be taken into consideration
(IMF 1996).
New lending facilities
Redesigned lending facilities that are better able to
deal with ﬁnancial crises, have also been introduced,
while obsolete facilities (e.g., the Buffer Stock Financ-
ing Facility) have been eliminated. In 1997, the Sup-
plementary Reserve Facility (SRF) was established to
provide additional liquidity to members experiencing
a ﬁnancial crisis resulting from “a sudden and disrup-
tive loss of market conﬁdence,” such as Mexico expe-
rienced in 1994 and emerging markets faced in 1997–98
(IMF Web site). While no speciﬁc limit has been set on
the amount of assistance that a country might receive,
loans under the SRFmust typically be repaid within 18
months. An interest surcharge over and above the
usualcostofborrowingisalsolevied.Theshortmaturity
and higher-than-normal interest rate reflect the
extraordinary nature of SRF borrowing and the expec-
tation that the borrowing country will take immediate
steps to calm ﬁnancial markets and reverse the out-
ﬂow of capital. This facility was used by Korea and
Brazil in 1998.
In 1999, the IMF introduced Contingent Credit Lines
(CCL). These allow member countries whose econo-
mies are judged to be fundamentally sound to estab-
lish precautionary lines of credit with the IMF to
protect themselves against a potential ﬁnancial crisis
caused by contagion. Such arrangements are expected
to be in the range of 300 to 500 per cent of quota.
Loans under the CCL would have the same maturity
as loans under the SRF. To be eligible for a contingent
line of credit, a country must, among other things,
have received a positive assessment from the Fund at
its previous Article IV consultation, be implementing
policies that are unlikely to give rise to balance-of-
payments problems, be maintaining constructive rela-
tions with its private sector creditors, and be ready to
submit a satisfactory economic and ﬁnancial program
aimed at restoring market conﬁdence. In late 2000,
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effectiveness of the CCL. The interest rate surcharge
was reduced, and the initial drawing on a CCL, equiv-
alent to one-third of the amount of the line of credit
established, became more automatic. Despite these
recent modifications, no CCLS have yet been established.
Private sector involvement
Of all the issues related to the reform of the interna-
tional ﬁnancial system, perhaps the most contentious
has been the role of the private sector in the manage-
ment and resolution of ﬁnancial crises. While there is
universal agreement that investors should bear the
risks as well as the rewards of their lending decisions,
and that debtors should repay their debts fully and on
time, there is considerably less agreement on what
should happen when a sovereign borrower faces a
ﬁnancial crisis and on the respective rolesoftheprivate
and official sectors in crisis resolution.
Some argue that the IMF should become a fully
ﬂedged international lender of last resort. Underpin-
ning this recommendation is a view that there are
market failures, that capital ﬂows are very volatile,
that investors are subject to ﬁnancial panics, and that
crises are contagious. In such a world, an international
lender of last resort could help mitigate not only the
effects of such instability but, by its very existence,
mitigate the instability itself (Fischer 1999). The anal-
ogy is typically drawn between the IMF lending to a
country and a central bank lending to illiquid, but sol-
vent, ﬁnancial institutions.
Others, however, contend that the IMF itself (and ofﬁ-
cial lending in crisis situations generally) is part of the
problem and should be abolished (e.g., Friedman
1998, Schwartz 1998, and Calomiris 1998). They argue
that ofﬁcial ﬁnancial support for countries in crisis
allows private creditors to get their money out intact
or with reduced losses. More generally, they claim that
the presence of an international lender, such as the
IMF, gives rise to serious problems of moral hazard,
which would only be exacerbated if the Fund were to
become a true international lender of last resort. When
there is a lender of last resort, lenders have less need
to assess and monitor foreign borrowers, which
potentially leads to an increase in risky behaviour
and, consequently, more ﬁnancial crises. Indeed, these
observers partly attribute the surge in lending to
emerging markets during the 1990s, as well as the sub-
sequent ﬁnancial crises, to a belief on the part of pri-
vate lenders that loans would be backstopped by
ofﬁcial lending.
The international community has steered a middle
course between these two extreme views, acknowl-
edging that ﬁnancial markets are not perfect and that
the IMF has a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial role to play in deal-
ing with international crises, especially those that may
pose a risk to the stability of the international ﬁnancial
system. Moral hazard is, however, recognized as a real
concern, and ofﬁcial money is limited. There is, conse-
quently, little alternative but to involve the private
sector in crisis management and resolution.
The IMF has a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
role to play in dealing with
international crises, especially those
that may pose a risk to the stability of
the international ﬁnancial system.
Sachs (1995) proposed the establishment of a formal
International Bankruptcy Code or court that would
facilitate a stay on payments, the provision of new
working capital, and a reorganization of old debts.
Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code was suggested
as a model. This chapter provides an alternative to
liquidating a failing corporation by maximizing the
value of the company’s assets to the beneﬁt of credi-
tors and shareholders.
Following the Mexican peso crisis, the G-10 studied
such formal mechanisms to address sovereign liquid-
ity crises. While they were seen as having considera-
ble appeal, the analogy with corporations was seen as
ﬂawed, since countries are sovereign. Unlike its
domestic counterpart, an international court could not
introduce new management or take possession of a
country’s assets. There were also signiﬁcant practical
difﬁculties, including diverse bankruptcy legislation
and practices. It was also felt that many of the results
of a formal international bankruptcy mechanism
could be achieved in principle through informal
mechanisms.
Both the 1996 G-10 report and a subsequent 1998
report of an ad hoc international (G-22)working group
argued that a temporary debt standstill, possibly
accompanied by exchange controls, might be required
to stop the hemorrhaging of capital from a country in
crisis and to allow time for the debtor to implement
economic measures and negotiate a restructuring of16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
its debts. Standstills could also help by arresting a
rush to the exits based on self-fulﬁlling creditor expec-
tations. In such circumstances, standstills could be
positive for both the debtor and its creditors.
The reports also stressed the merits of ﬁnding a volun-
tary co-operative solution; for example, through nego-
tiating a voluntary rollover of maturing credits or an
extension of maturities. There was also considerable
support for ongoing dialogue between debtors and
their creditors in both good and bad times. Better
communication would allow problems to be
addressed at an early stage rather than in a crisis
atmosphere. With the growing importance of bond
ﬁnancing by countries, greater use of collective-action
clauses was also recommended to expedite debt
restructurings in the event of a ﬁnancial crisis. Such
clauses would facilitate, for example, majority voting
by bondholders and the collective representation of
bondholders in negotiations with a debtor in distress.12
This informal approach has been broadly accepted by
the international community, and a framework for
dealing with ﬁnancial crises is emerging. Building on
earlier work by the G-7 ﬁnance ministers leading up to
the 1999 Köln Summit, the International Monetary
and Financial Committee of the IMF agreed in April
2000 that any approach adopted by the international
community should be ﬂexible enough to deal with
diverse cases (G-71999 and IMF 2000a). The committee
also noted that there was a wide range of possible
responses to ﬁnancial crises. In some cases, ofﬁcial
ﬁnancing and policy adjustment would be sufﬁcient
to permit a country to regain market access. In other
cases, “voluntary approaches” might be needed to
overcome creditor-coordination problems, while
“comprehensive debt restructuring” might be
required in those cases where it was unrealistic to
expect full market access to be restored. These points
were reiterated by the committee at its September
2000 meeting. It also noted that “a temporary pay-
ments suspension or standstill may be unavoidable.”
12.  Canada announced that it would adopt collective-action clauses in its
foreign currency bond issues in April 2000. The speciﬁc clauses adopted by
Canada cover collective representation, majority action, and the non-acceleration
of payments.
Despite this broad consensus, views differ on the
appropriate balance between a clear framework for
private sector involvement in crisis resolution to help
conditionmarketexpectationsandreduceuncertainty,
and the need for flexibility that recognizes that all crises
are different. In other words, to what extent should
there be rules or discretion?
To help advance this debate, the Bank of Canada and
the Bank of England have collaborated closely on
developing an integrated, but ﬂexible, framework for
international crisis management, involving both the
IMF and the private sector. A key element of this
framework is a presumption that limits on ofﬁcial
lending to countries in crisis would apply under most
circumstances. The proposal also recognizes the
desirability of debtors and their creditors ﬁnding a
voluntary solution to a ﬁnancial crisis. However, it
underscores the value of an orderly and temporary
standstill as a circuit breaker in the event that a volun-
tary solution cannot be found. The joint work of the
Bank of Canada and Bank of England has prompted
considerable interest and debate within a number of
international forums. Discussion on the respective
roles of the ofﬁcial and private sectors in crisis resolu-
tion continues.
Conclusion
During the last four years, policy-makers, academics,
and market participants have made considerable
efforts to strengthen the international ﬁnancial sys-
tem, balancing the need for efﬁciency on the one hand,
with safety and stability on the other. Differing views
remain in certain areas, however, especially on the
extent to which  rules should exist to govern the
expected actions of the private and ofﬁcial sectors in
the event of a crisis and the need for discretion to tai-
lor the response to the crisis. It will also take time for
countries to implement the many codes and standards
that have been developed. Nonetheless, considerable
strides have been made, which in time should help to
reduce the severity, scope, and frequency of ﬁnancial
crises. Moreover, when crises do occur, improved
management techniques should facilitate their resolu-
tion, permitting countries in distress to return quickly
to capital markets.17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
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